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In the Supre111e Court 
of the State of Utah 
w1~mNI~R KII£PE, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Cross Respondent, 
vs. 
J~LI D. LeCH1£MINANT, 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross Appellant 
(ca~<' No. 10310 
) 
APPF~LLANT'S BRIEF 
App(~al from the judgment of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County 
Hon. Marcellus K. Snow, Judge 
Wl'Arl'EM~JNT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
rrhis is an action for an accounting upon the disso-
lution of a partnen:;hip, primarily for the period between 
thP datP of dissolution and the completion of winding up. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a judgment dated November 
!l, 19fi4, which provided, among other things: 
I. ri1hat the Respondent ue awarded $2,500.00 for 
"pre.serving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership." 
2. That a bonus of $535.00 be awarded to Paeh of 
the parties. 
3. Adjudging that the lfospoudent is (•ntitled to 
lutal credits of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,(j()8.7l. 
1 
-t Adjudging that tlw Respond0nt is entitled to net 
credits of $16,443.22. 
5. Adjudging that cornpernmtion paid to Hnth Bar-
low and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as partner-
ship expense and be borne equally by the partner:s. 
6. Adjudging that the fee charged by Lawn•rn:e s. 
Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, should be a part-
nership expense and borne el1ually by the partners. 
7. Awarding Respondent a net balancP credit of 
$16,433.22 out of cash on hand of $28,'723.90. 
8. The Court denied Appellant's motion to amend 
the judgment of the Court dated March 12, 1964. 
REILIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the following portions 
of the judgment dated N overnber 9, 1964 and judgment 
in his favor as a matter of law therein, or, failing that, 
a new trial thereon: 
1. The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent for pre-
serving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership. 
2. The award of a bonus of $535.00 to each part:» 
3. Adjudging that the Respondent is t>ntitled t(I 
total credits of $20,101.9:3, less refunds of $3,()()~.ll. 
4. Adjudging that the Respondent i;,; entitled lo 
net credits of $16,433.22. 
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J. Appellant seeh reven;al of the order of the~ 
L'onrt denying his motion to amend the judgment of the 
r.'11nrt dated March 12, 190.+, to provide that the Hespon-
ii1·nt pay into a special fund tlw sum of $981.96 in addi-
11011 to the sum of 75 lJer eeut of $9,819.03 ordered paid 
11)· tlw Conrt into l:mid fund, out of ·which overcharges 
111aU\' by H!•spondent from patrons of the partnership 
;J10uld be repaid. 
tiespondent seeks reversal of the following portions 
111' the judgment of the Court dated November 9, 1964, 
~ncl judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or, failing 
that, a new trial thereon: 
1. A warding Respondent the sum of $2,500.00 for 
·vreserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership," 
11hen Respondent had asked for $5,000.00. 
:2. Adjudging that <.',Ornpensation paid to both Ruth 
Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as part-
n~rship expense and bt~ borne equally by the partners. 
;j, Ad;judging that the fee charged by Lawren(',e 
'~· Pinnock, Certifi<.•d Public Accountant, should be a 
partn<:>rshi p expPllS(' and hornt> (~qually by the partners. 
+. Awarding Respondent a net balance credit of 
~U1,-t33.22 out of cash on hand of $28,723.90, when Re-
'frnndent is entitled to more. 
S1'A'l'El\111JN'r OF F AiC':I1~ 
Appellant and Hespon<lent L'.Ollllllenced business as 
3 
of October 1, 1940, as real estate brokers. (R-3) 
lt was agreed that 50 per cent of all foes and com-
missions earned should be paid to the partner producing 
the same, ( R-3) and the remaining 50 per eent should 
be put into the profit and loss account frolll which all 
<."'xpenses of operating the business should be paid, and 
the balance divided elJUally Letwe(•n the partnern. 
Later it was agreed that the divi:::;ion of feel:l arnl 
commissions should be changed to pay to the one pro-
ducing the same 50 per cent of all such fees and com-
missions from $1.00 to $7,:200; 52% per ('.ent of total 
commissions from $7,:200 to $8,±00; 55 }Jer cent of total 
commissions from $8,400 to $9,600; 57112 per cent of total 
conunissions from $9,600 to $1:2,000; and GO p(~l' cent of 
total commissions in excess of $12,000. (R. 292 and R-
301) All sums so paid in excess of GO per cent of com-
mission earned have been com;idered as bonuses and 
paid at the end of each calendar year. 
Subsequent to October 1, 1943, 8tate Mutual In-
surance Company of vVorcester, l\lassachuseth;, appoint 
ed the partnership an agent to make real estate Joans for 
it and collections of the payments thereon, and agn·ed 
to pay one-half of on(" pPr cent of tlu_. total outstanding 
loans belonging to State Mutual Insurance Company 
each year for such collection :::;ervic(~. F'or tlw making 
of such loans, loan fees were charged by the partn<'rship, 
and usually collected from the borrower:::;. 'l11te rnakwg 
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ii tlw luam; and supervising the coll(;,ctions were largely 
tlii! work of the Respondent. ( H. 195) 'l1he fees for mak-
ing the loans and commissions on insurance sold \Vith the 
!oans were credited to the partner making them, usually 
the Respondent, upon which he received 50 per cent, 
[lid the remainder was put into the profit and loss ac-
1·ount. 
The Respondent at all times supervised the keep-
ing of the books of the partnership. Until after the Ap-
pellant gave notice of the termination of the imrtnership, 
1Deeember 30, 1962) he was unfamiliar with the books . 
. \fter he had checked the books, Appellant filed suit, 
alleging that the Hespondent had used for his own ill--
il1vidual use and benefit sums of money exceeding his 
,Jiare of the partnership income, and that he reflrned to 
m·ount therefor to Appellant. (H. 1-2) 
Trial wa:::; held on November Jli, December 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 19 and 20 in HJ6::L The R1:_•:::.;pondent was ordered to 
11a)· to the Appellant on account thereof $-±,697.70, which 
amount the Respondent paid. (R 61) In addition, in 
1l1P judgment rendered on .March 12, 196-1: on this matter, 
the Respondent wa:::; ordered to place in a special account 
i;j per cent of $9,819.65, and Appellant was ordered to 
pay into said account 25 per cent of said $9,819.65, from 
11·hich ov1:_•rcharges to customers of the partnership mad(~ 
h)· the Respondent should be repaid, and the balance 
11·111aining after said payments should be divided 30 
jJet ('t•Ht to tl1e Hespornh•nt and C>O pl'!' cent to Appellaut. 
From Exhibit P-10 placed in evidenc<-·, it aplJ('ars that 
the Respondent had received 13 per c1;:mt of $9,819.G5, 
plus a bonus of $981.96 thereon) and Appdlant had l'('.-
ceived 25 per cent of $9,819.65. 
On the 26th day of December, 19G3, punmant to 
stipulation of the parties, the parties each bid for all 
interest of the other in and to the assets of the vartner-
ship. After several bids had been made hy <-'ach of the 
parties, the Appellant made a bid of $40,000.00, and 
the Respondent refused to bid highel'. Punmant thereto, 
judgment dated .March 12, 196±, provided, among other 
things: 
''3. Plaintiff having bid $40,000.00 for the 
Defendant's interest in and to said assets and 
the Defendant having refused to bid higher for 
Plaintiff's interest therein, all of said assets are 
hereby awarded to the Plaintiff." (R. Gl) 
The judgment goes on to ::itate: 
''The Plaintiff ha::i paid to the Defendant 
said sum of $40,000.00, less the sum of the follm\-
ing amounts which the Court has found are O\\'-
ing from the Defendant to the Plaintiff (sums 
totalling $±,697.70)" (R. 61) 
The Appellant served notice of dissolution of the 
partnership upon Respondent on December 30, 19G2, 
to become effective February 1, 1963. Uespondent 
agreed to the dissolution. 
i:.,rorn January 1 19G3 to February 1 19G4 the part-
j_' ' •' ' ' 
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nel'8 continued to operate tlw bm;ine88 in tlw ::;a11H:' uia11-
ner a::; they had done prior to notice of dissolution. On 
F\·hruar~· 1, 1964, Re8pondent n-•moved from the office 
~pace occupied by the partnen;hip, an<l the Appellant 
took full control of the boolrn, reeord8 and other a8:sets 
qf the partnership. 
On February 13, 190±, a hearing wa::; had upon Re· 
spondent'::; claim for "compen8ation for his preserving 
the mortgage loan aecount with State Mutual ln8urarn·(~ 
l'ompany'' during the period of January 1, 1963 to 
~1ebruary 1, 1964, and his motion that wages paid to R 
[,,Christensen and Ruth Barlow be paid by tlte Appelhrnt 
instead of by the partnership for the samf• lH'riod. At 
tile conclusion of the evidence, the purport of tlie evi-
dence was discussed by the Court with counsel, during 
11·hich counsel for the Respondent mack the follow i11g 
>tatement: 
"l Haid if they would be willing to invoke the 
partnership agrePment all the way down the line, 
we would be willing to do that." 
The Court then Htated : 
"All right. The Court will adopt the sugges-
tion of l\lr. Backman that we go all the way down 
the line***. Neither parhwr will receive any 
special <·ompt•nsation for service8 during this 
inU,rim JH•riod, all(l all of tlw f'Xpt•n::;es by whiclt-
t'ver <h·pc.ntment incurn·d or by whom will be 
lnrnpl'd togt>tl1er and dt•<lueted frow the [Jl of it 
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and loss account***." (R. 244-245) 
A judgment was signed by the Court on March 12 
' 1964, pursuant to the oral memorandum decision afore-
said, (R. GO-(i--1:) which provided, among othn thin O's ao.· 0' ,, 
follows: 
"9. All income of each party hereto from 
January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, is hereby or-
dered to be received and distributed in the same 
manner as is provided by the partnership agree-
ment and as has heretofore been rect>ived and dis-
tributed, which includes insurance renewal com-
missions upon which the producer thereof shall 
receive 50 per ct:•nt and the remaining 50 per cent 
shall be deposited in the profit and loss account, 
out of which all expenses of operation by which-
ever department incuned or by whichever party 
incurred shall be lumped together and deducted 
from the profit and loss account, and the balance 
shall he divided equally ancl distrihut\~d one-half 
thereof to each of the parties to this action. 
"11. The judgment herein enten·d eonsti-
tutes an accord and satisfaction of all claims 
each of the parties hereto has against tlw 
other***." 
Of the transcript of testimony taken at said hear-
ing, more than half thereof was devoted to evidence con-
cerning the preservation of the mortgag(_• loan a:::;set by 
the Respondent. As above stated, at the eondusion of the 
testimony the Court stated that neither party \\'Ould n· 
ceive any special compensation for services during the 
8 
111terim period. (H. J-lj) Th<· provision of the judgrnen t 
quoted, that the judgrn<•11t eonstituted an at('Ol'd and sat-
1~fadion of all elairns l'ad1 of the parties had against the 
11 tlwr, referred particularly to Hm;pond<·nt's claim for 
~pecial compensation for preserving the mortgage loan 
a~set. This judgment lwtame final thirty days thL•reaft<>r. 
On J um· 13 and .J urn· :2-t, 1 ~u-t, a hl'aring was had 
npon petitions fil<•<l h~· Pad1 of the parties against the 
nther for an order to show ea use directed to the other, 
to sho,,· eause why lu~ shoul<l not Le punished for con-
ternpt of court for failun· to tomply with the judgment 
uf l\larch 1-±, 19li-l . .No L•vidence was adduted on thL• mat-
ter of payment of any special compensation to the Re-
ipondent for his efforts in preserving the mortgage 
loan asset of tlw partnership. At the conclusion of that 
ltParing the Court indicated that he would accept brief,:; 
1mly on the following matters: 
1. Contempt. 
L Bonus to Le paid over and above the 50 per cent 
producer's basic compensation. 
:J. '1,he salaries paid to ~1rs. Barlo\\,'". 
-1:. rrhe salaries paid to .Mr. Christensen. 
'11lie Court stated: 
"rl'hese four it<->ms are the only items co11-
cerning the Court." (R. :3!)7) 
On 8epteu1ber 1-l, lUu-±, th(· Court gavt~ a writtl-11 
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memorandum decision on the hearings of June 13 and 
June 24, which included the following: 
"l. rrhat the Respondent should receive the 
sum of $2,500.00 for his dforts during the iwriod 
January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964 in preserving 
the mortgage loan asset of the partnership. 
2. The graduated bonus plan of the partim·-
ship may be employed in determining the counui~­
sions to be allocated to each partner. 
3. The compensation as heretofore paid 
to both R.uth Barlow and R. L. Christensen shall 
remain and be allowed as a partnership expemw 
to be borne equally by the partners. 
4. The fee as charged by Lawrence S. Pin-
nock, Certified Public Accountant, shall be a 
partnership expense and paid from partnership 
funds and borne equally by the partners." (R. 
107-108) 
Counsel for Hespondent then prepared a judgment 
designated "Order" which was signed by the Court on 
November 9, 1964, which provided, among other things: 
"l. That the Respondent should be paid 
$2,500.00 for his efforts in preserving the mort-
gage loan asset of the partnership. 
2. Compensation heretofore paid to Huth 
Barlow and R. L. Christensen shall be allowed 
as a partnership expense, to be borne equally by 
the partners. 
3. The fee charged by Lawrence S. Pinnock, 
C.P.A. shall be borne equally by the partnerf'. 
4. That each partner shall be paid $535,()0 
10 
as a bonus. 
5. That n•funds of $3,G68.7 l Hhould he paid 
to the Appellant, and tlw Responcknt iH entitl(•d 
to receive $1G,-:!:33.2:2 out of cash on hand in the 
partnership of $28,723.98. '' ( H. 109-110) 
Appellant filed a motion to amend the judgment of 
the Court clatL·d Jlareh U, 19G-l-, to providt~ that the He-
~pondent pay into tl1l' special fund for refunds of over-
diarges an additional sum of $981.9(i. The Court denied 
the motion. 
E'ollowing is the eviden<.'.e pertinent to the matter::; 
at issue in this appeal and cross-appeal. 
Before the Court commenced taking testimony at 
the hearing of February 13, 19G-l-, he stated that it wm; 
hi8 underHtan<ling that the only thing to be considen~d 
at the hearing "is the respective service rendered to 
this operation since the dissolution," to which counsel 
for the Respondent answered, "Yes." (R. lG-1-) 
Mr. LeCheminant was the first witness called. He 
tPstified in effect that the mortgage loan business con-
~isted of making collections from some 600 accounts on 
a monthly basis. As the payments were received at the 
office, they were entered on a cash book by a clerk. The 
work of seeing that the accounts are kept cunent is more 
than a clerical operation. rrhat was the function he per-
formed. During the year tlH'Y had had 81 of tlH· GOU 
accountH which requi n·d rnon• or lt•ss eolledion effort 
11 
every month. Telephone calls were made to tl10i:;e peoplP 
and in addition some letters were v.-Titten, if they w1;rp 
unable to get the delinquent accounts on the tl•lephom·. 
In addition, State .Mutual Insurance Company required 
a delinquency statement and a statement of the reasons 
for the delinquencies each month. (R. 165) A statement 
was sent to the accounting department by a clerk and 
' 
one to the mortgage loan department which the Respon-
dent did. State 1\1 utual Insurance Company exerted a 
great deal of pressure concerning delinquencies. In addi-
tion to making collections, there was a maze of detail 
necessary to maintain the mortgage loan connection. 
That when Mr. Kiepe terminated the partnerhip, 
State Mutual Life could have cancelled its contract with 
the partnership at any time, and it was necessary to 
put forth additional effort to rnalu~ sure that the ac-
counts were properly handled. 
It was necessary to call personally upon some of the 
delinquent mortgagors. Respondent went to Draper on 
two or three occasions and to Magna on one. He went to 
Bountiful and to Centerville. During the year he made 
20 to 25 personal visitations and had personal conven;a-
tions with mortgagors. Some calls w+>re madt> after of-
fice hours, some during the day. During the year he 
spot-checked 70 to 100 homes. \Vhen Mr. Saunders of 
State Mutual Insurance Company was in Salt Lake City 
he inspected with him probably 20 houses. (R 1U7J 
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The insurance company wanted loans 011 e01m1ter· 
eial properties instead of homes as tht>y had pn·viously 
1.anted. It was necessary that <.'.011siderable work be done 
in submitting some co1m11vr<'ial loam.; in order to keu1J 
1!1L' insurance company informed that wt- \n•re at least 
attempting to satisfy their requirements. During th<· 
1('ar he submitted about 8 or 9 residential loans and in 
addition about 11 c0111mercial loans on which he had done 
r·onsiderable work. They were all turned down. ( R. Hi8) 
Respondent spent at least a part of each working 
day at the office on the business of maintaining the loans, 
rR. 170), and he had numerous telephone calls coneerning 
refinancing loans \\·hich they \Vere proeessing, and he 
thought he had convinced at least 20 people to leave the 
loan::; and do any additional financing some other ·way. 
iR. 170) 
ln the insurn.n<.'.e business they had a eashier who \Vas 
also a bookkeeper, and the Rt>spondt:•nt had a secretary 
who took eare of gt>iwral COIT<_•spondenee and prepara-
tion of mortgage loan papt>rs, and handled the insurance 
aecoun t. ( R. 170-171) 
At the beginning of 19G3, the total amount of mort-
gage loan business which thPy WPre servicing was close 
to $7 ,000,000. ( H. 17-!:) During 196;) the submission of 
luans \Vas minor, the clerical help so far as tlw secretar.'· 
was conc1•rned wa~ minor, al!d th1• insurane1• i·enewab 
until S<~ptt.-11tl>N, 1 %:) \\ PL"l' rn·gligihll'. l•'rnrn :ilay to 
13 
September, 1963, they had about GO policies of insmanc:· 
that had to be registered and sent out to customers, and 
that after that time there were some ±00. rrhey were all 
renewed at practically the same time. ( R. 171) 
Ruth Barlow did nothing except a ::m1all amount of 
work from May to September on insurance accounts. 
rrhe Respondent testified that he informed Mr. Kie1w 
that he would refuse to pay any part of Huth Barlow'8 
salary, that she was not needed in the office, and that 
she came there to do Mr. Kiepe's personal work (H. 17±). 
The Respondent \Vas asked by his counsel what in 
his opinion would be reasonable for the 1Court to allow 
to him by way of special compemmtion to be chargeable 
against Appellant. The Court interjected, "You mean 
for extra services rendered during the interim period.'' 
(R 17 4-175) Respondent further testified that the part-
nership income approximated $33,000 on the mortgagr· 
loan account and the insurance account, with an expense 
of $10,700, so that Respondent's share of the inconw 
from the mortgage loan department \Vould net $11,150, 
and Appellant's would be the same. In addition, during 
1963 Respondent's income from appraisal work was ap-
proximately $1,000 and approximately $110 from real 
estate sales and listings; his commissions on one com-
mercial loan was $5,600 and on two residential loan:-
about $350, and on personal insurance comrnission8 $800 
or $900. (R. 182) 
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Respornfont testifo·d tliat his adivitic·s i11 J9G:J wc·n~ 
110 different from an:· othPr :·ear so far as his mortgage 
Joan busilless was eoIH.'.t~nwd. I IP worked just as hard 
in UWO, 19Gl and 1 U(i:2 on that phase of U1e business as 
he did in J ~)(i::L Then· \ras nothing rn·w at'ter th(' dissolu-
tion of the iiartuernhi lJ in the a1110u11t of dfort that lw 
µut into thr• mortgag(• loa11 businesl-l. (H. 195-l!J(i) 
rJ1he partuernhip had (j00 or 700 Hl'.tOUnts. ~ach 
1·ustomer madl~ a 111onthly payment, either at the eounter 
or through th(' mail. Ht·spondent had nothing to do with 
the receiving of payments at the counter or. through the 
mail. They wen' listed and posted in the books of the 
partnership by a derk. lie had nothing to do with that. 
lle was then asked the follo\ving r1uestion and gave the 
following answer : 
"Question: Then the only thing that remains 
to be dom~ is to takt• care of the delinquent pay-
ments after that and make reports to the insur-
ance company, isn't that conect '? 
"Answer: That's substantially eoned." 
(R. 196) 
On making reports to tl1e eompany on eollections 
of the delinqueneies a elerk made the reports to the ac-
1·ounting department and the Ht•spoud1:·nt rl'ported to tlw 
mortgage loan departrnen t. ( H. 197) 'l1he Hesponden t 
wrott- five to S(•ven lf'tfrn.; a mouth to :State Mutual In-
surance Com1Jan:· on eollL~dions. lt would take iim:-he 
15 minutes to write a ldter. (H. 198) 
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Appellant introduced into evidence and read intn 
the record a letter dated December 19, 19G3 from State 
Mutual Insurance Company to the Respondent which is 
most uncomplimentary of Respondent's handling of the 
mortgage loan account. (R. 203-204) 
Respondent was asked if Appellant ever asked him 
to take care of the mortgage loan account, to which he 
answered no. He answered yes to the statement, ''You 
were just as much interested in preserving that account 
for yourself as you were for anybody else." (R. 205) 
Mrs. Ruth Barlow was then called and testified in 
substance as follows: During 1963 from February 17 
to August 31, the period of time during which she was 
employed by the partnership, thv Respondent arrived at 
the office on the average about 9 :~30 - between 9 :00 and 
10 :00 in the morning. His leaving time was at 3 :00 or 
3 :30 each day. On at least two or three days a week, he 
would leave about 11 :00 and come back at 1 :00. He 
usually spent the time between 11 :00 and 1 :OU at the 
Deseret Gym. \Vhen he left the office in the afternoon, 
he usually went home or to the Desert Gym. He had 
a standing appointment two days a week at 3 :00 with 
Brother Jonathan at the Deseret Gym. (R. 210-211) 
Respondent spent part of a morning twice a month 
dictating on delinquent accounts. (R. 212) When she 
was working with Respondent, he dictated reports to 
State Mutual and she typed them, usually a two-page 
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Jetter. It didn't take long. 8he was hi8 secretary in 1960, 
19til and 1962. Hi8 coming and going during those years 
1rns the ::mme as in 19G:J. ( H. 212-213) 
Hespondent's mn1 rnortgagv loans whieh h(• had in the 
office in 1963 amounted to $108,5G5.2-l: as of April Hi, 
1963. ( R. 216) 
.Mr. Kiepe testified in substanee as follows: That I 
L'lllployed Mr. R. L. Christensen as an understudy to 
help me in making appraisals. He did a great deal of 
work in bringing UlJ to date the accounting system in the 
loan account and in bringing to date the insurance pol-
ieies. I employed people to carry on the mortgage loan 
business because I found tht-~re was a very bad accumula-
tion of insurance policies which needed to be sent out. 
l employed Ruth Barlo-w for that purpose. Later on 
others helped in the same process. (H. 220-221). 
Appellant finished $28,825 of appraisal work in 1963 
and produced $3,295.00 in real estate conm1is8ions. ( R. 
2±2) 
'1'hu8 Appellant produced $32,120.00 income during 
1963 which wa8 turned into the partnership. 
'l1he bonu8cs Pach earned during 1959 to and includ-
lllg U)G2 (R. 29±) and during the period in question, 
lU63, (R. 120-122) were as follows: 
17 
Year LeChcminan t 
1959 ---------------------------·-·····-· $4,046.34 
1960 ------------------·-···-····---·-··· 1,676.39 











rrhe earnings of the Respondl,nt and tlu~ Appellant 
during the period in question, January 1, 19G:3 to Febrn-















THE AW ARD OF $2,500.00 TO RESPONDENT BY THE 
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT. 
rrhe judgment designated "Order'' filed on Novem-
ber 9, 1964, provides as follows : 
"(a) Defendant LeCherninant will receive tl1r 
sum of $2,500.00 for hi~ efforts and services dm-
ing the last thirtet>n rnontlu:; in pre~·wrvinp; tlll' 
mortgage loan asset of the partm·r~hip." 
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There were no 1Jleading8 or I<'in<ling8 of E'act to 
~upport thi8 part of the ,judgment. Said judgment of 
:\uvemher 9, 19ti':!, wa8 entered purnuant to a hearing had 
(In the 13th day of J mw, 19G3, which wa8 continued to 
and concluded on the 2-!th of June, 19ti+. 'l'he only plead-
ings in that matter \\'ere petition::; for onlern to show 
t•ause directed to each of the parties by the other, order-
ing each to ::;how cau::;e why he 8hould not be found guilty 
11!' contempt for failure to abide by the judgment of the 
Court entered on March 12, 1964. 'l1here was not a word 
11[ evidence or other proof adduced at the hearing held 
on said day::; relative to Re::;pondent's efforts in preserv-
ing the mortgage loan as::;et of the partnernhip. 
lf there had been evidence on this matter, it would 
have been necessary to file finding::; in ::;upport of this 
part of the judgment. 
As ::;tated in Gaddis lnve::;tment Con11mny vs Charles 
JI. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284: 
''lt ha::; been frequently held that the failure 
of the trial court to make finding::; of fact on all 
material issues is reversible error where it is 
prejudicial. Hall v::; Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 
1110; Baker v::; Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673; 
Prows vs Holley, 72 Utah -±-!-!, 271 P. 31; Simper 
V8 Brown, 73 Utah 17S, 278 P. 529; vVest Vi:\ 
Standard E'uel Company, 81 Utah 300, 17 P.2d 
292; Pike v::; Clark, 95 l 'tah 235, 79 P.2d 1010." 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial (R. 118) 
19 
and for amendments of judgment on .N ovcmbl'r 9, 196.J: 
(R. 119) in which the Court's attention was callPd to thP 
fact that there had been no F,indings of Fact m Con-
clusions of Law entered in support of the above portion 
of said judgment. (R. 118-119) The Court overruled the 
motion for a new trial and filed an order denying Ap-
pellant's motion to amend. Nothing was done about mak-
ing Findings of Fact. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE AWARD OF $2,500.00 
TO THE RESPONDENT WAS lVIADE BY THE JUDGMENT 
OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 WAS TRIED ON FEBRUARY 13, 
1964, AND WAS ADJUDGED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT 
BY THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964, WHICH JUDG-
MENT HAD BECOME FINAL AND WAS RES ADJUDICATA 
OF SAID ISSUE AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF THE 
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964. 
The issue upon which the award of $2,500.00 to Re-
spondent was made by the judgment of November 9, 1964, 
was tried on February 13, 19G4. At the conclusion of tllf' 
evidence, the Court ruled: 
"N either partner will receive any compensa-
tion for services during this interim period.'' 
(R. 244-245) 
A judgment was signed and filed hy tlir• Conrt pnr-
suant to said ruling (R. 60-64) which provided, among 
other things, as follows : 
"9. All income of each party hereto from 
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.January 1 1963 to "B1 ebrnan· 1 Hl6-1 is hereby ' . ' . 
ordered to be received and distributed in the 
~.;arne manner as is provided by the partnership 
agreement and as has heretofore been received 
and distributed.*** 
"11. '11he judgrnent herein constitutes an ac-
cord an<l satisfaction of all daims each of the 
parties hereto has against the other." 
l111e judgment of .March 12, 196-1 became final and 
11as res adjudicata of the issue of ·whether Respondent 
irns entitled to any cornpem;ation for pernerving the 
mortgage loan m;set for the partnership. 
8ince February 13, 196-1, no evidence has ever been 
introduced thereon. To date, rww more than a year since 
the judgment was entered, no motion for a nt-w trial 
of the matters tried on February 13, 19G-t and on which 
the judgment of March 12, 19G± was t-ntered has ever been 
filed. No motion to amend the judgment or for any relief 
therefrom has evt-r been filed. 'l'he judgment could not 
be amended without filing a motion to amend within a 
reasonable time, which in this case would not be more 
than ninety days. (Rule (iO(b), Ftah Hules of Civil 
Procedure). 
As the Court stated m Kettner vs ~no\\·, J 3 Utah 
~d 382, 375 P.2d 28: 
"We are in accord with the proposition urged 
by the Dt.•fondant that the trial court has broad 
discretion in granting ne\r trials and in allowing 
:.n 
claims un<l.t· 1· Rnle 60 ( b) (rd id from judgment 
or order). But this power is not without limit a 
tion and cannot be exercised capriciomily or ar-
bitrarily. It is ek•mentary that under th<• cireurn-
stances the general rules of procedure are binding 
and that a party who has allowed the time to 
move for a new trial to expire is thereafter pre-
cluded from doing so. '11his can be avoided onlv 
where it is made to appear that for one or mor.e 
of the reasons specified in Rule 60 ( b), .im;tice ha~ 
been so thwarted that equity and good conscience 
demand that this extraordinary relief be granted 
and the burden of showing facts to justify doing 
so is upon him who seeks such relief." 
Said Rule oO(b) relative to judgment provides: 
"The motion shall be made within rea8onable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and (4) not 
more than three months after the judgment, or-
der or proceeding was ordered or taken." 
Apparently the Court took the position that he 
could change any judgment entered by him at any time. 
In the case of Frost vs District Court of Box 1£lder 
County, 83 P.2d 737, 9ti Utah lOo, this Court quoted 
with approval from Freeman on Judgments, Volume 
1 of the 5th ~.Jdition, Section 141, as follows: 
"As a general rule, unless control over it has 
been retained in some proper manner, or a statuiP 
otherwise provides, no final judgment can be 
amended after the term in which it was ren<l<~red 
or after it otherwise Leeome8 a final ju<lgwenl. 
The po\ver of courts to conect dPrital erron 
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and mispri sons and to make th(_• n~<'onl s1wak tlu, 
truth by nunc pro tune amendrnents after the 
term does not enable them to chang(~ their judg-
ments in substance and in any material respect, 
and this is true even though the judgment has not 
been formally entered of record by the clerk 
where such entry is not essential to its validity. 
Consequently, it is well settled that in the absence 
of a statute permitting it, the law does not author-
ize the correction of judicial enors, however 
flagrant and glaring they may be, under the pre-
tense of conecting clerical errors." 
ln Kettner vs Hnow, 13 L~tah 2d 382, 375 .P.:2d 28, 
above cited, Headnote 4 reads: 
"A trial court has broad discretion in grant-
ing new trials and in allowing claims under the 
rule authorizing courts to grant a party relief 
from judgment within a reasonable time, not to 
exceed three months after a judgment has been 
rendered, hut this power cannot be exercised ar-
bitrarily. Rules of 1Civil Proc(J,dun•, Rule 60(h) ." 
On June 13, 1964, more than three months had ex-
pired after the entry of the judgment of March 12, 1963 
1rhen the hearing was had \\d1ich did not include any 
i:;sue of special compensation to Respondent nor a word 
of evidence thereon, but upon which the Court finally 
entered a judgment on .N overnber 9, 196± in favor of 
Respondent for $2,500.00. 
POINT III 
THE AW ARD OF $2,500.00 TO RESPONDENT BY THE 
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964, IS NOT ONLY NOT 
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SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT 
BUT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE GIVEN AT 
THE HEARING OF FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND IS CON-
TRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVI-
DENCE. 
lf for sake of argument it i8 a8smned that tl10 judg-
ment of March 12, 19G4 had not become re8 adjudicata 
before the Court reverned any part of the judgment of 
March 12, 19G4 denying Respondent any compensation 
for extra service8 rendered in preserving the mortgage 
loan account, no such award should have been made 
to the Respondent for the rea8on that the evidence ad-
duced at the hearing of February 13, 1964 would not 
support such an award. During the course of the trial 
held February 13, 1964, counsel for the Respondent asked 
Respondent what in his opinion would be fair compen-
sation to be awarded to him by the Court for his service~ 
in preserving the mortgage loan asset. rrhe Court intPr-
jected: 
"You mean for extra services rendered dur-
ing the interim period?" 
to which .Mr. Backman replied, "Yes." (R. 17-1:-175) 
The Hespondent by hi8 evidence attempted to prove 
that he had rendered great service to the partnership 
in preserving the mortgage loan as8et, hut in fad hy his 
own testimony he established that he had perfornwd no 
extra services in that particular during the period .Jan-
uary 1, 196:3, to February 1, 1964, and a8 her0tofore 
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~tated, at the conclu::;ion of the testimony, the Court 
stated: 
"N eitlwr party will receive any special com-
pensation for ~wrviees during this interim period." 
(R. 245) 
Punmant to said ruling, a judgment was ('ntered on 
}larch u, mo±, which provided, among other things: 
"ll. Tlit~ judgment herein entered eonsti-
tutes an accord and safo:;faction of all claim::; 
each of the parties hereto ha::; against ·the other." 
\rhich refened partitulady to Hespondent'::; daim for 
.~pecial compen::;ation for pre::;erving the mortgage loan 
asset. 
H.espondent testifed that hi::; activitit~s in 19G3 (the 
intt>rim period) were no different from any other year 
>o far as the mortgage loan business \\·as conterned. He 
11orked just as hard in 19GO, 19(:)1 and 1962 on that phase 
11[ tlw business as he did in 1963. There was nothing 
llP\\' after the dissolution of the partnership in thL' 
amount of effort that he put into the mortgage loan busi-
1wss. ( R. 195-196) 
After testifying to the work which he did on delin-
quent atcounts and iu \\Titing letters to keep State Mu· 
tt1al Insurance Company satisfied, and the personal calls 
tliat lw made to 20 or 25 honw::; ( R. 1G7) toncerning tlw 
matter of taking care of the account, hp testifit-d that 
2b 
all collections came into the office at the counter or 
through the mail and were posted to the books, all uf 
which was done by clerks. He was then asked the follow-
ing question and made the following an:::;wer: 
''Question : 'J1hen the only thing that remairn, 
to be done is to take care of the delinquent pay-
ments after that and make reports to thP in 
surance company, isn't that correct'? 
"Answer: 'i'hat's substantially correct." 
(R. 196) 
On making reports to the insurance comnam lll' 
1:-' '' 
testified that he wrote 5 to 7 letters a month, which took 
maybe 15 minutes per letter to write. (R. 198) 
He was asked if the Appellant had ever asked him 
to take care of the mortgage loan assd, to which he 
answered no. He answered yes to the statement, "You 
were just as much interested in preserving that aecount 
for yourself as you were for anybody else." (R. 205) 
The Respondent was paid $-!-0,000.00 by Appellant 
for his interest in the partnership assets (R. 61), which 
was almost entirely for the mortgage loan asset. As 
above quoted, he testified that he was as much interestPd 
in preserving that asset for himself as he was for any-
one else. He received more for his half interest in that 
asset from the Appellant than ht~ \ras willing to pay to 
the Appellant for his half interest therein. 
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rrhe Court ordered the intome from .January l, l 9Gi3 
to ~'ehruary 1, 1964 to be distributed in the same manner 
<I~ provided in the partnernhip agreement. ( H. 63) rrhis 
i~ in accordance with th<c• provisions of ~edion -1:8-1-:!I, 
I tah Code Annotated, 1953, relative to winding up of 
a partnership after dissolution. 
Respondent took care of the mortgage loan asset 
111r many years before 1963, but received no special 
1·1)]1lpensation therefor in addition to his fees for making 
loans and co1mnissions on immran<:e written with the 
loans. 
'l'he amount Respondent received for his work in 
1%:) was grossly excessive considering the time and ef-
fort he put into the business and the very limited amount 
11'1' new commissions he brought into the partrnmship. 
Ile received $25,655.58 ( R. 120, 122) for approximately 
half-days' work (R. 210, 211). He brought in $8,550.00 
1Jf new income (H. 182) while Mr. Kiepe brought in $32,-
120.00 of new income, consisting of appraisal fees and 
1·1·al estate sales commissions, (R. 242) and received 
.s:H,±02.19 (R. 120, 122). It was chiefly the income from 
the asset for which Ap1)ellant paid $-1:0,000.00 for Respon-
1lPnt's half interest which resulted in the payment to 
RP~pondent of $25,655.58. 
Respondent's manner of "preserving the mortgage 
loan asset" brought a severe reprimand from State .Mu-
inal Insurance Company. See lettt•r of December 19, 
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l 963, to Respondent. (R. 203-204) 
The payment of any extra compem;ation to Hespon-
dent finds no support in the Pvi<lenc<:>. 
POINT IV 
THE AW ARD OF A BONUS OF $535.00 TO EACH OF 
THE PARTIES IN THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 
1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS 
OF FACT, NOR BY ANY EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
There are no pleadings or Findings of Fad support-
ing the award of a bonus of $535.00 to each of the parties. 
On the contrary, there appears in the records the statr· 
ment prepared by Lawrence S. Pinnock, Certified Pub-
lic Accountant, (R. 122) for the period in question. rrliat 
statement shows that the Appellant earned a bonus of 
$2,365.96 and Respondent a bonus of $908.19. (R. 122) 
The award of an additional bonus of $535.00 to each of 
the parties would beenfit neither party. As shown in the 
statement rendered by Mr. Pinnock, there \Vere certain 
moneys remaining in the partnership account ont of 
which payment was to be made to the parties. 
If an additional $535.00 is a\varded to each of the 
partners, it must come out of the moneys on hand 
equally and would thus reduce the profits allowed to 
each of the parties, to wit, $15,556.44, by $535.00 paeh. 
Thus, neither party would receive any additional rnorn·y. 
No mention was made in the Court's rnemoranduw 
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decision of a bonus of $;);)5.UO or an:· amount. (R. 107-
108) 
POINT V 
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 
9, 1964 WHICH READS: "THIS BRINGS TOTAL CREDITS 
TO WHICH DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED THE SUM OF 
$20,101.93, LESS REFUNDS OF $3,668.71 ,, -::- -:- RESULTS 
IN A NET BALANCE CREDIT TO WHICH DEFENDANT 
rs ENTITLED TO $16,433.23 OUT OF THE CASH ON HAND 
OF $28,723.98, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT 
OR BY ANY EVIDENCE. 
No mention was rna(fo in the Court's 11wu101andmn 
rh·cision of the ''rl1otal credits to whid1 Defendant is 
entitled" or "the amount of the refunds to whieh Plain-
tiff is entitled" or "tlw net balanee credit to which De-
fendant is entitled." rl1hen~ is not a word of evidence 
or Findings of Fact on any one of these items in the 
record. 
The total credits to which Defendant is entitled, 
the amount of refunds due Plaintiff, and the net credit 
l1alanc<· to which Defendant is entitled can only Le deter-
111ined after this Court has ruled on the various items 
11f this appeal and cross-appeal. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MO-
TION TO Al\IEND THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964. 
One provision of the ju<lg1ut>nt of Mardi 12, l~.Hi-1: 
reads: 
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''As to Item G of Plaintiff's selwdul<· recpivrd 
in evidence as Exhibit P-10, reflecting items total-
ling $9,819.65, it is ordered and adjudg<•d ilrnt 
this amount shall be placed in a special account 
75 per cent tlwreof to be paid by the Defendant 
and 25 per cent thereof to be paid by the Plaintiff. 
That all overcharges to customers of the partner-
ship collected by the partnership for anything 
shall be paid from the aforesaid special account. 
** *1Costs of making such refunds shall be paid out 
of said special account. When all refunds have 
been made and all costs, deducted, the balance f('-
maining in said special account shall be paid 
one-half thereof to each of the parties." (R. m-62) 
Appellant's motion was to amend the above provi-
sion of the judgment of the Court of March 12, 1964 by 
substituting therefor : 
"As to Item 6 of Plaintiff's schedule received 
in evidence as Exhibit P-10 reflecting items total-
ling $10,801.61, it is orden~d and adjudged that 
this amount shall be placed in a special account, 
75 per cent of $9,819.65 plus $981.96 thereof to 
be paid by the Defendant and 25 per cent of 
$9,819.65 to be paid by the Plaintiff." 
Exhibit P-10 showed jtems totalling $9,819.65 plus 
a bonus of $918.65 taken by Respondent. It was an ob-
vious mistake or clerical error that tlw amount of 
$9,819.65 was written into the judgment and not $9,819.65 
plus the bonus of $981.96, a total of $10,801.61, of which 
amount Respondent should return 75 per cent of $9,819.65 
plus $981.96 into the special a<'count, sine<· it wa:-; tlw 
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intent of tlw Court that all moneys received by the> parties 
in this matter should be returned into the Court. 
Appellant's motion to amend was argued on .July 
U, 1965. Before counsel for Appellant made the argu-
111ent, the Court stated: 
"lf there is a typographical mistake, natural-
ly it can be conformed by stipulation of the 
parties, but other than that I have heard the ease 
and I am not going to make any new - receive 
any new evidence or make any different deter-
mination." (8upp. R. 3-4) 
Coum;el for Appellant then stated: 
"It wouldn't make a different determination 
and it would not require any evidence***Looking 
from the exhibits it can be seen from the exhibit 
that that amount is wrong." (Supp. R. +) 
The Court then stated: 
''Well, Mr. Backman can see it as well as the 
Court can, can't he~" (Supp. R. 4) 
Upon the conclusion of Appellant's argument, coun-
~el for Respondent stated: 
"I can't understand Mr. Iverson. This is 
the first time we will admit and we have discused 
it a number of times, and I have followed his 
contention and I believe we can work it out. And 
if there is an apparent error, we drew the judg-
ment. 
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"Mr. l venwn: Ye[';, you drew the jndglllL'llt." 
(Supp. R. 6) 
At the condm;ion of the hearing the Court stated: 
"LT nless .Mr. Backman consents to this arneH<l-
ment, motion to amend this paragraph and so on 
then I \Vill deny it." (Supp. H. 7) ' 
'l1hereafter Mr. Backman would neither agree nor 
refuse to agree to the order amending the judgment, 
and to make the matter appealable, Appellant wa~ 
obliged to prepare and have the Court sign the order 
denying the motion. 
This is a unique decision. Counsel for R.espondPnt 
admitted Appellant was right. (Supp. R. 6) Yet the 
Court denied the petition to amend. The Court at no 
time indicated that Appellant was not right. He took 
the position that he would grant the amendment if Re-
spondent's counsel would consent thereto, but not other-
wise. 
The rule against giving relief from judgments unlc::>8 
motions are filed in time does not apply to relief from 
clerical errors. As lieretofore stated in this brief, tllf' 
law on this matter is stated in the case of Frost v:s Di1l-
trict Court of Box Elder County, 83 P.2d 737, 96 Utah 
lOG. This court quoted with approval from :F'reeman on 
.Judgments in Volume 1, Fifth J~~dition, Sc>C'tion 1-n, n~ 
follows: 
;_-U 
"As a general rule, unless control over it has 
been retained in souw proper manner or a statute 
otherwise provides, no final judgment can be 
amended after the t<Jrrn at which it was rendered 
or after it otherwise becomes a final judgment. 
The power of court:-; to correct clerical errors and 
misprisons and to make the record speak the truth 
lJy n'Ullc pro tiwc amendments after the term does 
not <·nable them to cliange their judgments in sub-
stance and in material respects." 
Can a motion be denied in advance of hearing it 
unless tlH• other side stipulates to the Court's granting 
the same, and then aftt>r the other side admits that coun-
sel making the motion is rlght, may the Court deny tlw 
motion unless opposing counsel will stipulate to the 
amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
'11he Appellant submits that the law and the evi-
dence require that: 
1. The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent for pre-
sPrving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership be 
sr>t aside. 
2. rrhat the bonus of $535.00 to each partnl'r be set 
aside. 
~). rrhat the portion of the judgment which finds 
the amount of credits to which Respondent is entitled, 
which fixes the amount of refunds due Appellant, and 
th<· balance credit due Hespomknt be set asidt·, and this 
matter returned to the trial court for a new trial. 
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4. Appellant's motion to amend the judgment of 
March 12, 1964 nunc pro tune be granted. 
Respectfully submitted . 
.. . , .,._: ; ~. ': ::' -r~:. 
I I, .. ~ 
